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Abstract—In human-robot collaboration (HRC), software-
based automatic safety controllers (ASCs) are used in various
forms (e.g. shutdown mechanisms, emergency brakes, interlocks)
to improve operational safety. Complex robotic tasks and in-
creasingly close human-robot interaction pose new challenges
to ASC developers and certification authorities. Key among
these challenges is the need to assure the correctness of ASCs
under reasonably weak assumptions. To address this need, we
introduce and evaluate a tool-supported ASC synthesis method
for HRC in manufacturing. Our ASC synthesis is: (i) informed
by the manufacturing process, risk analysis, and regulations;
(ii) formally verified against correctness criteria; and (iii) selected
from a design space of feasible controllers according to a
set of optimality criteria. The synthesised ASC can detect the
occurrence of hazards, move the process into a safe state, and,
in certain circumstances, return the process to an operational
state from which it can resume its original task.
Index Terms—Controller synthesis, human-robot collabora-
tion, software engineering, probabilistic model checking.
I. INTRODUCTION
An effective collaboration between industrial robot systems
(IRSs) and humans [1], [2] can leverage their complementary
skills, but is difficult to achieve because of uncontrolled
hazards and unexploited sensing, tracking, and safety mea-
sures [3]. Such hazards have been studied since the 1970s,
resulting in elaborate risk taxonomies based on workspaces,
tasks, and human body regions [2], [4]–[10]. The majority
are impact hazards (e.g. unexpected movement, reach beyond
area, dangerous workpieces, hazardous manipulation), trap-
ping hazards (e.g. operator in cage), and failing equipment.
Addressing these hazards involves the examination of each
mode of operation (e.g. normal, maintenance) for its hazardous
behaviour, and the use of automatic safety controllers (ASCs)
to trigger mode-specific safety measures [2]. Malfunction
diagnostics (e.g. fault detection, wear-out monitoring) can
further inform the ASC. As shown in Tab. I, a variety of safety
measures [3] can prevent or mitigate hazards and accidents by
reducing the probability of their occurrence and the severity
of their consequences. There are functional measures using
electronic equipment (e.g. speed & separation monitoring) and
intrinsic measures not using such equipment (e.g. fence, flex-
ible surface). Functional measures focusing on the correctness
and reliability of a controller are called dependability mea-
sures [5], [11]. Functional measures are said to be passive if
they focus on severity reduction (e.g. force-feedback control),
active otherwise (e.g. safety-rated monitored stop).
The standardisation of safety requirements for IRSs [4]
culminated in ANSI/RIA R15.06, ISO 10218 [12], 13482, and
15066. According to ISO 10218, an IRS comprises a robot
arm, a robot controller, an end-effector, and a workpiece (see,
e.g. Fig. 2a below). In collaborative operation, the operator
and the IRS (called a cobot [13]) can occupy the collabora-
tive workspace (i.e., a subset of the safeguarded workspace)
simultaneously while the IRS is performing tasks [14]. Based
on that, ISO 15066 recommends four safety modes, described
and combined with work layouts in [8], [15]:
• safety-rated monitored stop (powered but no simultaneous
activity of robot and operator in shared workspace),
• hand-guided operation (zero-gravity control, guided by
an operator, no actuation without operator input),
• speed & separation monitoring (speed continuously
adapted to distance of robot and operator), and
• power & force limiting (reduced impact on the human
body, a robot’s power and applied forces are limited).
In the following, we highlight recent challenges and explain
how our work addresses these.
Challenges: Since the 1980s, tele-programming and simu-
lation have led to a reduction of hazard exposure. However,
guarding arrangements interfere with manufacturing processes
and mobile robots. Complex tasks require continuous and close
human-robot interaction (e.g. mutual take-over of tasks), mu-
tual clarification of intent, and trading off risk [15], [16]. Robot
movements need to be predictable and impacts on the human
body need to be attenuated (e.g. speed & separation monitoring
requires stereo vision and laser scanners to distinguish safety
zones). Engineers need to consider a variety of complex failure
modes. This situation implies requirements and design spaces
for ASCs, so engineers want to answer questions such as:
• Which ASC design minimises the probability of incidents
in presence of human and sensor errors?
Table I: IRS safety measures by stage of causal chain
Stage Type of Measure Examples
Hazard
prevention
1. safeguard/barrier fence, interlock
2. IT safety verified safety controller
3. IT security security-verified (safety) controller
Hazard
mitigation
& accident
prevention
4. reliability fault-tolerant scene interpretation
5. workspace intru-
sion detection
speed & separation monitoring,
safety-rated monitored stop
6. shift of control hand-guided operation
Accident
mitigation
(alleviation)
7. power & force
limitation
low weight parts, flexible surfaces;
variable impedance, touch-sensitive,
& force-feedback control
8. system halt emergency stop, dead-man’s switch
ar
X
iv
:2
00
7.
03
34
0v
1 
 [c
s.R
O]
  7
 Ju
l 2
02
0
• Which design minimises nuisance to the human, max-
imises productivity, etc. while maintaining safety?
• Does a selected controller correctly handle hazards when
detected and return the system to a useful safe state?
Contributions: We introduce a tool-supported method for
the synthesis of discrete-event ASCs that meet safety re-
quirements and optimise process performance for human-robot
cooperation (alternative use of shared workspace) and col-
laboration (simultaneous use of shared workspace, with close
interaction) [8], [17]. We model the manufacturing process
and its safety analysis as a Markov decision process (MDP)
and select a correct-by-construction ASC from a set of MDP
policies. We extend our notion of risk structures [18] and
our tool YAP [19]. This simplifies the modelling of activities
and actors, critical events (CEs, e.g. hazards), mitigations (e.g.
safety mode changes) and reward structures for risk optimi-
sation; and automates the translation of risk structures into
MDPs. Our approach facilitates the verification of safety of
the MDP and of probabilistic reach-avoid properties of a
selected policy. A verified ASC detects hazards and controls
their mitigation by (i) the execution of a safety function, (ii) a
transition to a safer mode, or (iii) a transition to a safer activity.
Overview: Sec. II discusses related work, Sec. III introduces
our case study as a running example, and Sec. IV provides the
theoretical background. We describe and evaluate the ASC
synthesis method in Sec. V and Sec. VI, respectively, and we
conclude with a short summary in Sec. VII.
II. RELATED WORK
To the best of our knowledge, our method is the first end-
to-end approach to synthesising ASCs for handling multiple
risks in HRC for manufacturing processes.
Askarpour et al. [20] discuss a discrete-event formalisation
of a work cell in the linear-time temporal language TRIO.
Actions are specified as pre/inv/post-triples (with a safety
invariant) for contract-based reasoning with the SAT solver
Zot. In contrast, our approach builds on probabilistic guarded
command language (pGCL), separating action modelling from
property specification. Beyond counterexamples for model
repair, our approach yields an executable policy. While their
use of a priority parameter helps to abstract from unnecessary
state variables, we propose guards to implement flexible in-
dividual action orderings. Moreover, violations of inv lead to
pausing the cell whereas our approach can deal with multiple
mitigation options offering a variety of safety responses.
For generic robot applications, Orlandini et al. [21] employ
the action language PDDL for modelling and timed game au-
tomata for controller synthesis. The model checker UPPAAL-
TIGA is used for verifying (i.e., finding winning strategies for)
reach-avoid properties of type A(safe U goal). While game
solving could enhance our verification approach, our method
focuses on guidance in risk modelling for safely optimised
HRC performance. Cesta et al. [22] present an approach to
synthesise controllers (i.e., plans) for HRC applications using a
timeline-based PDDL planner. While they distinguish control-
lable (i.e., duration known) from uncontrollable actions (i.e.,
welder
robot
arm
effector
(a) Safeguarded area (company)
(b) Workbench (company)
(c) Replica (research lab)
Figure 1: Actual (a, b) and replicated (c) cobot setting
duration unknown), an important aspect of HRC modelling,
their focus is on task planning and scheduling rather than on
risk modelling for verified synthesis of ASCs.
Heinzmann and Zelinsky [23] propose a power & force
limiting mode always active during an HRC activity described
as a discrete-event controller. Long et al. [24] propose a speed
& separation monitoring scheme with nominal (max. velocity),
reduced (speed limiting), and passive (hand-guided operation)
safety modes. While these authors do not aim at synthesis or
task modelling, their elaborate safety modes may serve as a
target platform to our multi-risk synthesis approach.
III. RUNNING EXAMPLE: MANUFACTURING COBOTS
Fig. 1 shows an IRS manufacturing cell at a UK company
(with the pictures anonymised for confidentiality reasons) and
replicated in a testbed at the University of Sheffield (Fig. 1c).
The corresponding process (call it P) consists of activi-
ties (Fig. 2b) collaboratively repeated by an operator, a
stationary robotic arm, and a spot welder (Fig. 2a). Previous
safety analysis (i.e., hazard identification, risk assessment,
requirements derivation) resulted in two sensors (i.e., a range
finder in Fig. 1a and a light barrier in Fig. 1b, indicated in red)
triggering an emergency stop if a person approaches the welder
or enters the workbench while the robot or welder are active.
Tab. II shows our partial safety analysis of the cell following
the guidance in Sec. I. The right column specifies safety goals
against each accident and controller requirements (e.g. mode-
switch requirements) handling each latent cause in the left
column, and indicating how the hazard is to be removed.
IV. PRELIMINARIES
Our method uses MDPs as a formal model of P , and MDP
policies as the design space for controller synthesis.
Definition 1. Markov decision process (MDP). Given all
distributions Dist(αP) over an action alphabet αP of a
process P , an MDP is a tuple M = (S, s0, αP , δP , L) with a
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Table II: Our partial safety analysis of the manufacturing cell referring to the measures recommended in ISO 15066
Id Critical Event (Risk Factor) Safety Requirement
Accident (to be prevented or alleviated) Safety Goal
RC Robot arm harshly Collides with operator The robot shall avoid harsh active collisions with the operator.
WS Welding Sparks cause operator injuries The welding process shall reduce sparks injuring the operator.
RT Robot arm Touches the operator The robot shall avoid active contact with the operator.
Latent Cause (to be mitigated timely)† Controller Requirement
HRW Human operator and Robot use Workbench at the
same time
(m) The robot shall perform a safety-rated monitored stop and (r) resume normal operation
after the operator has left the shared workbench.
HW Human operator is entering the Workbench while
the robot is away from the bench
(m) If the robot moves a workpiece to the bench then it shall switch to power & force
limiting mode and (r) resume normal operation after the operator has left the workbench.
HS Human operator has entered the Safeguarded area
while robot moving or welder active
(m) The welder shall be switched off, the robot to speed & separation monitoring. (r) Both
shall resume normal mode after the operator has left and acknowledged the notification.
HC Human operator is Close to the welding spot while
robot working and welder active
(m) The welder shall be switched off, the robot to safety-rated monitored stop. (r) Both shall
resume normal or idle mode with a reset procedure after the operator has left.
† m. . . mitigation requirement, r. . . resumption requirement
Spot
welder
Robot
Safeguarded
workspace
Workbench
Collaborative
workspace
Operator
(a) HRC setting (conceptual, top view)
main
idle
base
moving
exchWrkp
welding
(b) Process activities
Figure 2: Conceptual setting (a) and activities in the manufacturing
process (b) performed by the operator, the robot, and the welder (in
blue), classified by the activity groups moving and base (in gray)
set S of states, an initial state s0 ∈ S, a probabilistic transition
function δP : S × αP → Dist(αP), and a map L : S → 2AP
labelling S with atomic propositions AP [25].
Given a map A : S → 2αP , |A(s)| > 1 signifies non-
deterministic choice in s. Its resolution for S forms a policy.
Definition 2. Memoryless Policy. A memoryless policy is a
map pi : S → Dist(αP) s.t. pi(s)(a) > 0 ⇒ a ∈ A(s). pi is
deterministic if ∀s ∈ S ∃a ∈ A(s) : pi(s)(a) = 1 ∧ ∀a′ ∈
αP \ {a} : pi(s)(a′) = 0.
The following discussion is restricted to deterministic mem-
oryless policies. Let ΠM be the set of all such policies forM.
Then, action rewards defined by a map rqaction : S × αP →
R≥0 allow the assessment of ΠM based on a quantity q.
Verification ofM is based on probabilistic computation tree
logic (PCTL) whose properties over AP are formed by
φ ::= > | a | ¬φ | φ ∧ φ | Eφ | Aϕ and ϕ ::= Xφ | φUφ
with a ∈ AP ; an optional bound b ∈ N+ for U∼b with
∼ ∈ {<,≤,=,≥}; the quantification operators P∼b|=? ϕ to
verify (or with =?, to quantify) probabilities, S∼b|=?[a] to
determine long-run probabilities, Rq∼b|[min|max]=?[Fφ | C[∼b]]
to calculate reachability and accumulative action rewards,
and the abbreviations Fφ ≡ >Uφ, Gφ ≡ ¬F¬φ, and
φWψ ≡ φUψ ∨ Gφ. For sake of brevity, consider the
treatment of PCTL in [25], [26].
The concise definition of δP , the behaviour of P , is facil-
itated by PRISM’s [25] pGCL. Guarded commands are of
the form [α] γ −→ υ where α is an event label and υ a
probabilistic update applicable to s ∈ S only if s |= γ, where
γ is an expression in the propositional fragment of PCTL.1
Generally, υ ::= pi1 : υ1 + · · · + pin : υn with Σi∈1..npii = 1
and assignments υi to state variables of type B, N, or R.
For safety analysis, we view the cell in Sec. III as a process
P , monitored and influenced by an ASC to mitigate hazards
and prevent accidents. An accident a ∈ S is an undesired
consequence reachable from a set Ξ ⊂ S forming the causes
of a. The fraction of a cause c ∈ Ξ not related to the operator
is called a hazard h [27], [28]. We call c latent2 if there are
sufficient resources (e.g. time for removing h by transition to
s 6∈ Ξ) to prevent the accident. h includes states in S \ Ξ
being critical because certain events (e.g. an operator action)
cause a transition to Ξ, and possibly a, if h stays active, further
conditions hold, and no safety measures are put in place timely.
Risk modelling can be facilitated by specifying risk factors
and combining them into risk structures [18]. A risk factor f is
a labelled transition system (LTS) modelling the life cycle of
a critical event (i.e., hazard, cause, mishap). f has the phases
inactive (0f ), active (f ), and mitigated (f) and transitions
between these phases signifying endangerment events (e ) and
mitigation (m ) and resumption (mr) actions. Let F be a
set of factors, e.g. the ones in column Id in Tab. II. The
Cartesian product of the phases of the factors in F yields
the risk space R(F ). To utilise factor LTSs for the translation
of ASC designs into pGCL, we further develop the notion of
risk factors in Sec. V-B as part of our contribution.
V. APPROACH: SAFETY CONTROLLER SYNTHESIS
Fig. 3 shows the steps and artefacts of the proposed method
detailed below and illustrated with a running example.
1We use −→ to separate guard and update expressions and → both for
logical implication and the definition of mappings.
2As opposed to immediate causes reducing the possibilities of risk handling.
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Figure 3: Main steps and artefacts of the proposed method (future
work indicated in dashed lines)
// Locations
const atTable = 0; const sharedTbl = 1; const inCell = 2; const
atWeldSpot = 3;
// Status of workpiece support
const empty = 0; const left = 1; const right = 2; const both = 3;
// Status of range finder
const far = 0; const near = 1; const close = 2;
Figure 4: Fragment of the data type definition in PRISM
A. 1 Modelling the Manufacturing Process
Activities in P (Fig. 2b) are structured by sets of guarded
commands. We distinguish actions of controllable actors (e.g.
robot arm, welder, operator) and the ASC, and events of a
sensor module and shared “manipulables” (e.g. workpiece sup-
port). S is built from discrete variables (cf. Fig. 4) capturing
the world state (e.g. robot location; workbench status), sensory
inputs (e.g. range finder), control outputs (e.g. robot behaviour,
notifications), user inputs (e.g. start button), and modes (e.g.
current activity, safety mode).
Mode variables (e.g. ract, safmod) are used to specify a
filter φa for enabling actions that form an activity (e.g. grab
workpiece, move arm to welder), or a filter φsm for enabling
actions in a particular safety mode. Thus, the structure of
guarded commands for P follows the pattern
[α] ¬ω ∧ φsm ∧ φa ∧ γ −→ υ
with an action label α, a guard ω to prevent from leaving the
final state, a check γ of individual conditions, and an update
expression υ (cf. Sec. IV). Given a set Ssm of safety modes,
modelling involves the restriction of guarded commands of all
actors in P , by adding φsm and φa to their guards, to obtain
mode- and activity-aware guarded commands.
Example 1. Fig. 5 specifies the two robot actions r moveToTable
and r grabLeftWorkpiece of the activity exchWrkp.
[r moveToTable] !CYCLEEND
& (safmod=normal|safmod=ssmon|safmod=pflim)
& ract=exchWrkp
& !rloc=sharedTbl & ((wps!=right&reffocc) |wps=left&!reffocc )
−> (rloc’=sharedTbl);
[r grabLeftWorkpiece] !CYCLEEND
& (safmod=normal|safmod=ssmon|safmod=pflim|safmod=hguid)
& ract=exchWrkp
& rloc=sharedTbl & ! reffocc & wps=left
−> (reffocc’=true)&(wpfin’=false) ;
[r placeWorkpieceRight] !CYCLEEND & (safmod=normal|safmod=ssmon|
safmod=pflim|safmod=hguid) & ract=exchWrkp & rloc=sharedTbl &
reffocc & wpfin −> (reffocc’=false);
Figure 5: PRISM model fragment of the module robotArm
B. 2 Safety Analysis and Risk Modelling
Fig. 6 further develops the notion [18] of a risk factor f
towards guidance in the formalisation of hazards, causes, and
mishaps and the events forming a causal chain (e.g. a mishap
event leads to a mishap state). Based on that, f supports the
design of hazard mitigations to reduce accidents, and accident
alleviations to reduce consequences. Hence, each critical event
needs to be translated into a risk factor. Example 2 instantiates
f with the hazard HC from Tab. II.
Example 2. For the hazard HC, Fig. 6 describes
(a) how an endangerment e f activates HC (i.e., leads to a risk state
ρHC ∈ R(F ) where the predicate HC holds true),
(b) how mitigations (e.g. issuing an operator notification) update
P to enter the phase HC (i.e., HC is false),
(c) further mitigations (e.g. waiting for operator response),
(d) resumptions (e.g. switching from speed & separation monitoring
to normal) that update P to return to phase 0HC where both
HC and HC are false,
(e) further endangerments (e.g. erroneous robot movement) re-
activating HC from state HC,
(f) a mishap event moving P into a state with HC true (i.e., an
f-accident occurs),
(g) alleviations to handle consequences of HC in phase HC.
Phase f ′, reachable by non-deterministic or probabilistic
choice, models an undetected endangerment (e.g. because of
a faulty range finder for HC) that can lead to f. For sake of
simplicity, the endanger choices in f and f
′
are not shown.
f, f
′
, and 0f form the f-safe region of P . Example 3 explains
how one models risk for the welding activity in YAP script.
Example 3. First, the Activity section of Fig. 7 specifies that
welding includes the specification of the activity moving and that
the activity exchWrkp is a successor of welding. This way, one
specifies an activity automaton for P as shown in Fig. 2b.
Next, the HazardModel section lists critical events relevant to
welding, the two mishaps RC and RT and the latent cause HC (cf.
Tab. II). One can hypothesise high-level relationships between critical
events using constraints. E.g. RC requiresNOf (2|HRW,HS,HC|2)
expresses the assumption that exactly two of the listed events have to
have occurred before RC can occur. Such relationships are typically
identified during preliminary hazard operability studies (HazOp),
system FMEA, or system FTA.
Furthermore, HC is specified by (a) an informal description, (b) a
guard describing its activation HC , (c) mis (i.e., an action, e.g.
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actions considered, —. . . minimum amount of information to be
provided for a risk factor, - -. . . optional modelling aspects.
Activity {include moving; successor exchWrkp;}
HazardModel {
RC requiresNOf (2|HRW,HS,HC|2);
RT requiresNOf (1|HRW,HS,HC);
HC desc ”(H)uman (C)lose to active welder and robot working”
mitDeniesMit (HRW,HW,HS,RC,RT)
guard ”hACT WELDING & hloc=atWeldSpot”
detectedBy (SHARE.HCdet)
mitigatedBy (SHUTDOWN.HCmit,SHUTDOWN.HCmit2)
resumedBy (NOTIFY.HCres,NOTIFY.HCres2)
mis=”h exitPlant”
prob=0.2 // of mishap if HC not detected OR not mitigated timely
sev=5; }
Figure 7: YAP risk model for the welding activity from Fig. 2b
of the operator, with the mishap HC as a bad outcome if HC is
undetected or not mitigated timely), (d) prob (i.e., the probability of
HC under these conditions), and (e) sev, quantifying the severity of
the best, average, or worst expected consequences from HC.
Probabilistic choice in M can be used to model several
uncertainties. Informed by FTA and FMEA, one can consider
sensor and actuator faults. In our example, the range finder
as the detector of eHC fails by 5% when the operator enters
the cell. Informed by HazOp, human errors can be modelled
similarly. In our example, with a 10% chance, the operator
enters the cell, knowing that robotArm and welder are
active. Moreover, one can model the probability of occurrence
of a mishap under the condition of an active hazard. In our
example, with a 20% chance, HC may follow HC ′ (i.e.,
HC remains undetected because of the aforementioned sensor
fault) or HC (i.e., the ASC is not reacting timely).
C. 3 Designing Mitigation and Resumption Options
The capabilities of actors in P determine the controlla-
bility of critical events. We found three techniques useful
in designing mitigations and resumptions: action filters (i.e.,
safety modes, cf. Sec. I), activity changes (e.g. change from
welding to off), and safety functions (e.g. notification).
Recall that mitigations and resumptions are actions (i.e., tran-
sition labels in a risk factor LTS). Accordingly, the example in
mode HCdet desc ”range finder”
guard ”hACT WELDING & rngDet=close”
embodiedBy rngDet;
mode HCmit desc ”protective emergency stop of robotic system”
event stop
update ”( notif ’=leaveArea)”
target ( act=off , safmod=stopped)
disruption =10
nuisance=2
effort =1;
mode HCres desc ”resumption from emergency stop”
event resume
guard ”notif=leaveArea & !hST HOinSGA”
update ”( notif ’=ok)”
target ( act=exchWrkp, safmod=normal);
Figure 8: YAP action specifications for the risk factor HC
// Critical event predicates
// HC:monitor ”(H)uman (C)lose to active welder and robot working”
formula RCE HC = hACT WELDING & hloc=atWeldSpot;
formula CE HC = hACT WELDING & rngDet=close;
Figure 9: Monitor predicates for HC generated for the PRISM model
Fig. 8 specifies details about the actions referred to in Fig. 7.
Here, the following parameters drive the design space of an
ASC: (a) a detectedBy reference (i.e., associating the guard
with a sensor predicate), (b) a mitigatedBy reference to one
or more mitigation options, and (c) a resumedBy reference
to one or more resumption options. For this approach, we
extended YAP’s input language to develop these actions into
guarded commands.
Example 4. As an example for (b), in Fig. 8, the action HCmit of
type SHUTDOWN (i) synchronises with the robotArm and welder
on the event stop, (ii) update models a safety function, issuing
a notification to the operator to leave the safeguarded area, and
(iii) target switches the manufacturing cell to the activity off and
to the safety mode stopped, all triggered by the range finder.
Indicated in Fig. 6, HCmit models one option for mHC.
One can distinguish several such options by quantities such as
disruption of the manufacturing process, nuisance of the op-
erator, and effort to be spent by the machines. In combination
with processing time and value for each nominal action of P ,
these quantities enable the evaluation and selection of optimal
policies as we shall see below.
This part of the YAP model can be translated into pGCL.
Endangerments are translated into commands of the form
[e f
′
] φa ∧ χ −→ f ′ and [e f ] φa ∧ ζ −→ (1− p) : f + p : f ′
with guards including a hazard condition χ and a correspond-
ing monitoring (or sensor) predicate ζ. Constraints, such as
requiresNOf in Example 3, are then used to derive part of ζ.
Example 5. Fig. 9 indicates the transcription of guard and detect-
edBy into a pair of predicates, RCE HC describing actual states,
and CE HC signifying states monitored by the range finder, where
p can denote the sensor fault probability.
Mitigations are translated into commands of the form
[m ft ] φt ∧ f −→ υt′ and [m f ] φsm′,a′,sf ′ ∧ f −→ f
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with t ∈ {sm, a, sf } in φt for checking permission in the
current safety mode, activity, and state of safety functions,
and in υt′ for hazard removal by switching into a safer activity
a′, a safer mode sm ′, and by applying the safety function sf .
These updates are checked by φsm′,a′,sf ′ to be able to proceed
to f. Resumptions are translated into commands of the form
[m fr,t] φt ∧ ρf −→ υt′ and [m fr] φsm′,a′,sf ′ ∧ ρf −→ 0f
where φt guards the resumption based on the safety mode
and function in place, ρf ⊆ R(F ) restricts permission to risk
states (Sec. IV and Fig. 6) with f mitigated; and υt′ inverts
the safety function (sf −1), relaxes to the safety mode sm ′,
and returns to an, ideally more productive, activity a′ of P .
D. 4 Verified Controller Synthesis
The present approach follows a two-staged search through
the ASC design space: The first stage is carried through by
YAP when generating the guarded commands. The second
stage is performed by PRISM when synthesising MDP poli-
cies. For search space reduction, YAP employs risk gradients
between safety modes and activities in the first stage. For the
second stage, YAP generates reward structures for some of the
quantities introduced in Sec. V-C.
1) Guarded Command Generation: The generation of υt′
for mitigations and resumptions requires the choice of a safety
mode and activity to switch to, depending on the current mode
and activity. Given activities Sa and modes Ssm , two skew-
diagonal risk gradient matrices Sa ∈ R|Sa|×|Sa| and Ssm ∈
R|Ssm |×|Ssm |, e.g. manually crafted from safety analysis, can
resolve this choice based on the following justification.
Assume a1, a2 ∈ Sa vary in physical movement, force, and
speed. If a1 means more or wider movement, higher force
application, or higher speed than a2, then a change from a1
to a2 will likely reduce risk. Hence, a positive gradient is
assigned to Saa1a2 . Similarly, assume m1,m2 ∈ Ssm vary P’s
capabilities by relaxing or restricting the range and shape of
permitted actions. If m1 permits stronger capabilities than m2,
then a change from m1 to m2 will likely reduce risk. Again,
we assign a positive gradient to Ssmm1m2 . The diagonality of S
provides the dual for resumptions where a negative gradient
of the same amount from m2 to m1 is assigned to Ssmm2m1 .
Let current safety mode c and mitigation m f with target
mode t. m f (m fr) changes to t only if the gradient from c to
t is ≥ 0 (≤ 0). If Ssmct ≥ 0, then a switch to t is included
in υsm′ , otherwise υsm′ leaves M in c. We implemented this
scheme for activities analogously.
Example 6. Fig. 10 shows the result of applying this scheme in the
generation of an ASC for the risk factor HC based on Fig. 8.
Essentially, S approximates the change of risk in case of a
change from one activity or safety mode to another. Using S,
the majority of an ASC can be described in YAP script.
2) MDP Verification: This step requires establishingM |=
φwf ∧φc with properties expressed in PCTL (Sec. IV). φwf is
a well-formedness property including the verification of, e.g.
hazard occurrence and freedom of pre-final deadlocks, and
// Endangerments (monitor)
[si HCact] wact=welding & ract=exchWrkp & CE HC & !(HCp=act |
HCp=mis)
−> (HCp’=act);
...
// Escalation to mishap if not mitigated ( for analysis only)
[ h exitPlant ] true −>
((!HCp=mis & (CE HC | RCE HC))?0.2:0):(HCp’=mis)
+((!HCp=mis & (CE HC | RCE HC))?0.8:1):true;
// Mitigation with synchronous events
[s HCstop] wact=welding & ract=exchWrkp & HCp=act −> true;
...
// Change of safety modes
[si HCmitsafmod] safmod=normal & HCp=act −> (safmod’=stopped);
...
// Execution of safety functions
[si HCmitfun] HCp=act & !((notif=leaveArea)) −> (notif’=leaveArea);
// For entering the mitigated phase
[si HCmit] HCp=act & (notif=leaveArea) & !CE HC −> (HCp’=mit);
// Switching off safety functions
[si HCresfun] HCp=mit & !CE HC & notif=leaveArea & !hST HOinSGA
−> (notif’=ok);
// Resuming to a less restrictive safety mode
[si HCressafmod] safmod=normal & HCp=mit & HCp=mit & (notif=ok)
−> (safmod’=normal)&(HCp’=sfd);
...
// Resuming agent’s activities (via synchronisation )
[s HCresume] HCp=sfd & !CE HC & (notif=ok) −> (HCp’=inact);
Figure 10: PRISM model fragment generated for the risk factor HC
the falsification, e.g. that final states must not be initial states.
φwf helps to simplify model debugging, decrease model size,
guarantee progress, and reduce vacuity. φc specifies safety-
carrying correctness including, e.g. ASC progress (and across
cycles, liveness), particularly, that ΠM (i.e., the ASC design
space) contains complete mitigation paths from critical events.
Tab. III lists examples of φwf and φc to be verified of M.
3) Policy Synthesis: The ASC design space (ΠM) is created
by commands (e.g. mitigations, resumptions) simultaneously
enabled in s ∈ S, yielding multiple policies for s and some
commands enabled in multiple states, giving rise to a policy
for each ordering in which these commands can be chosen.
An optimal policy pi?, including the ASC decisions, can be
selected from ΠM based on multiple criteria (e.g. minimum
risk and nuisance, maximum productivity). For that, M uses
action rewards to quantify (i) productivity, up- and down-time
of P; (ii) factor-, mode-, and activity-based risk; risk reduction
potential; disruptiveness and nuisance; resource consumption;
and eff ective time of the ASC.
Example 7. Fig. 11 shows a pGCL fragment generated by YAP.
4) Discrete-time Markov chain (DTMC) Verification: Due
to known restrictions in combining multi-objective queries
and constraints in PRISM, part of the verification applies
to the policy as a DTMC. This step requires establishing
pi? |= φs where φs can include liveness, safety, and reliability
properties (e.g. “reach-avoid” of type A G Fψ ∧ A G¬φ; the
probability of failure on demand of the ASC; the probability
of a mishap from any hazard is below a threshold). Tab. III
lists examples of properties to be verified of pi?.
Fig. 12 visualises pi? as a graph with nodes for all states
6
// Risk of occurrence of HC
rewards ”risk HC”
[r moveToWelder] (RCE HC | CE HC) & !CYCLEEND : 5;
[rw weldStep] (RCE HC | CE HC) & !CYCLEEND : 10;
[h approachWeldSpot] (RCE HC | CE HC) & !CYCLEEND : 7;
...
[ h exitPlant ] notif =leaveArea & (RCE HC | CE HC) & !CYCLEEND :
2;
endrewards
...
// Nuisance (e .g. to the human operator; per mitigation option )
rewards ”nuisance”
// HC−mitigation: HCmit
[si HCmitsafmod] (HCp=act | HCp=mit) : 2.0;
[s HCstop] (HCp=act | HCp=mit) : 2.0;
[si HCmitfun] (HCp=act | HCp=mit) : 2.0;
endrewards
Figure 11: PRISM rewards for risk from HC and nuisance of HCmit
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Figure 12: Bird’s-eye view of the policy synthesised for the query
Rpotmax=?[C]∧Reffmax=?[C]. Nodes are the states reachable in M from
s0, including HC-safe states (green), HC-unsafe states (orange), and
mishap states (red). Edges indicate robotArm and welder actions
(red), actions of the operator (black), the ASC (green), and cycle
termination (blue). The gray fragment is magnified in Fig. 13.
reachable from s0, and edges for all transitions generated by
δP as derived from the guarded commands of P . The edges
form executions of M from s0 under pi?.
Example 8. Fig. 12 provides a bird’s eye view of a synthesised policy.
States coloured in green form the set HC-safe, i.e., states in which
HC is inactive or mitigated.
Fig. 13 shows a fragment of Fig. 12. Note the 5% chance
of a sensor failure from state 90 leading to state 92 (i.e., the
operator has approached the robotArm and welder) where
HC will remain undetected and not handled. Otherwise, in state 93,
HC will be mitigated after the next work step of the robotArm and
welder leading to state 202. From there, the ASC mitigates to a
protective stop (state 176), and resumes to state 178 (i.e., where
the operator has left the safeguarded area) from where the current
manufacturing cycle can be finished (state 33).
Table III: Examples of checked properties and queried objectives
Property† Description
Well-formedness φwf of M
v: E F(f ∧ ¬final) Can the hazard f occur during a
cycle of P?
f: E F(deadlock ∧ ¬final) Are all deadlock states final? Does
P deadlock early?
f: A F f Is f inevitable?
f: ¬∃s ∈ S : final ∧ init Are there initial states that are also
final states?
v: E F final Can P finish a production cycle?
Querying for a (Pareto-)optimal ASC pi?
Rpotmax=?[C] ∧ Reffmax=?[C] Assuming an adversarial environ-
ment, select pi that maximally
utilises the ASC.
Rprodmax=?[C] ∧ Rsev≤s [C] ∧ Rrisk≤r [C] Select ASC that maximises produc-
tivity constrained by risk level r
and expected severity s.
Rprodmax=?[C] ∧ Rsev≤s [C] Select ASC that maximises produc-
tivity constrained by exposure p to
severe injuries.
Cycle-bounded correctness φc of a policy pi (or the policy space ΠM)
v: A F(ζ → A X f ) Does the ASC on all paths imme-
diately detect the hazard χ?
v: A F(f → (A F f → (A F 0f))) Does the ASC lively handle hazard
f in all situations?
v: E F(f ∧ F final) Does the ASC resume P so it can
finish its cycle after f has occurred?
v: P>p[G¬mishap] Is the probability of mishap free-
dom greater than p?
Reliability φr of a selected ASC pi?
v: S<p mishap Is the steady-state (long-run) prob-
ability of any mishap f below p?
† deadlock . . . state with no commands enabled, final . . . end of man-
ufacturing cycle, init . . . initial state of a manufacturing cycle, mishap
. . . mishap state, p . . . probability bound, v . . . to be verified, f . . . to be
falsified, prod . . . productivity, sev . . . severity, eff . . . ASC effectiveness,
risk . . . risk level, pot . . . risk reduction potential
VI. EVALUATION
In this section, we discuss the adequacy and efficacy of the
proposed method from several viewpoints.
A. Research Questions and Evaluation Methodology
Based on the questions raised in Sec. I, we investigate the
(i) scalability and performance of the approach and (ii) the
effectiveness of the ASCs synthesised by it, asking:
RQ1 How well can the approach deal with multiple hazards
and mitigation and resumption options? What are the
resulting model sizes and analysis times?
RQ2 What is the likelihood of incident/accident-free opera-
tion under the control of the synthesised ASCs?
RQ3 Which process overheads are to be expected of an ASC
implementation?
For RQ1, we consider as inputs and parameters a YAP
risk model and a PRISM MDP model of the cell (with YAP
template placeholders), a single initial state of these models
where all actors are in the activity off and no hazard is active.
Accordingly, we prepare and analyse multiple increments of
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Figure 13: Fragment of the policy shown in Fig. 12. Split at state
177 for layout efficiency.
the risk model, each adding one critical event, mitigation
options, and constraints to the model.
For RQ2, let Ξ ⊂ S be the set of non-accident F -unsafe
states, i.e., states labelled with at least one critical event,
describing the abstract state where any critical event has at
least been sensed by the ASC (e.g. CE HC with its handling
not yet started, i.e., 0HC). For MDPs, we evaluate accident
freedom with
P¬A ≡ fs∈Ξ Psmin=?[¬mishap W safe] (1)
where f ∈ {min,mean,max}. For Ξ, Formula (1) requires
the ASC to minimise the probability of mishaps until an F -
safe state (i.e., S \ Ξ) is reached. In Tab. IV, bµe denotes the
triple comprising min, the arithmetic mean µ, and max. P¬A
aggregates these three probabilities over Ξ.
Next, we synthesise policies for each of the MDP incre-
ments for the three optimisation queries
Rpotmax=?[C] ∧ Pmax=?[F final t ], (a)
Rprodmax=?[C] ∧ Pmax=?[F final t ], and (b)
Reffmax=?[C] ∧ Rnuismax=?[C]. (c)
where final t = {s ∈ S | s ∈ final ∧ all tasks finished}. In the
spirit of negative testing, Formula (a) aims at maximising the
use of the ASC (i.e., approximating worst-case behaviour of
the operator and other actors) while maximising the probability
of finishing two tasks, i.e., finishing a workpiece and carrying
through cell maintenance. This query does not take into ac-
count further opmitisation parameters defined for mitigations
and resumptions. As opposed to that, Formula (b) fosters the
maximisation of productivity, any combination of decisions
allowing the finalisation of tasks is preferred, hence, transitions
leading to accidents or the use of the ASC are equally
neglected. While Formula (c) also forces the environment to
trigger the ASC, these policies represent the best ASC usage
in terms of nuisance and eff ort. Because of constraints in the
use of Rmin for MDPs, we maximise costs interpreting positive
values as negative (e.g. the higher the nuisance the better).
Figure 14: Pareto curve with five policies for Formula (c) for model
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We investigate the Pareto curves of the policies synthesised
from the Formulas (a) to (c). For policies with less than
1000 states, we inspect the corresponding policy graphs (e.g.
whether there is a path from initial to final or whether paths
from unsafe states reachable from initial avoid deadlocks). Fi-
nally, we evaluate accident freedom according to Formula (1),
except that we use P=? for DTMCs instead of Pmin=?.3
B. Results
For the experiment, we used YAP 0.5.1 and PRISM 4.5, on
GNU/Linux 5.4.19 (x86, 64bit), and an Intel R© Core i7-8665U
with up to 8 CPUs of up to 4.8 MHz, and 16 GiB RAM.
Tab. IV shows the data collected from seven models created
for RQ1 and RQ2. The result bµe = [1, 1, 1] for a policy
denotes 100% conditional accident freedom. This desirable
result is most often achieved with Formula (c) due to the
fact that simultaneity of decisions of the environment and the
ASC in the same state is avoided by focusing on rewards only
specified for ASC actions. Such rewards model the fact that
an ASC is usually much faster than an operator. Formulas (a)
and (b) show poorer accident freedom because productivity
rewards given to the environment compete with rewards given
to the ASC to exploit its risk reduction potential.
For demonstration of YAP’s capabilities, the incident RT
and the accident RC are included in the risk model without
handler commands. However, these factors add further con-
straints on R(F ) to be dealt with by the ASC. Hence, mr
stays at 15 actions and c rises to 15 constraints. In model
7 (last line of Tab. IV), the Ξ-fraction of S (12079 states) and
R(F ) (122 risk states) differ by two orders of magnitude. We
believe, such an abstraction underpins the potential usefulness
of the proposed risk model in such applications.
For RQ3, we can at the current stage of this project
only provide a ballpark figure for the detection and handling
overheads. Let t : αP → R be the processing time required for
an action, e.g. for the calculation of the detection of HC in eHC.
If implemented as part of a sequential cell controller, the ASC
requires a time slot of length Σf∈F t(e f) in each control cycle.
If monitored simultaneously in dedicated ASC hardware, the
slowest detection rate for F is 1/maxf∈F t(e f). The overhead
for handling f can be estimated from Fig. 6 and may range
from t(mHC) to Σk∈{sm,a,sf }
(
t(m fk) + t(m
f
r,k)
)
.
3To keep manual workload under control, if PRISM lists several adver-
saries, we apply the experiment procedure only to the first listed.
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Table IV: Results of the experiment for RQ1 (scalability) and RQ2 (accident-free operation)
Risk Model† MDP† (a) max-ASC† (b) max-prod (c) opt-ASC
F mr/c |R(F )| tY P¬A Ξ sta/tra P¬A Ξ tP P¬A Ξ tP P¬A Ξ tP
[ms] bµe bµe [s] bµe [s] bµe [s]
HC 5/0 3 40 [.9,.9,.9] 14 322/1031 [1,1,1] 3 .02 [1,1,1] 1 .02 [1,1,1] 6 .15
+HS 9/2 5 52 [.92,.96,.98] 256 930/3483 [.07,.66,1] 11 .77 [0,.88,1] 8 .82 [.95,.98,1] 18 .9
+WS 11/3 8 44 [.93,.97,1] 288 1088/3865 [0,.29,1] 17 2.1 [0,.8,1] 5 2 [1,1,1] 24 1.5
+HRW 13/7 16 65 [.93,.97,1] 981 7675/33322 [1,1,1] 17 9.7 [1,1,1] 11 9.4 [1,1,1] 15 13.3
+HW 15/8 36 76 [.93,.97,1] 2296 21281/98694 [1,1,1] 15 42.9 [0,.71,1] 7 41.4 [1,1,1] 15 46.6
+RT 15/9 50 87 [.93,.97,1] 2864 21965/100133 [1,1,1] 13 48.2 [1,1,1] 9 46.4 [1,1,1] 15 53.8
+RC 15/15 122 162 [.93,.99,1] 12079 21670/102263 [0,.94,1] 35 38 [0,.72,1] 22 36.6 [1,1,1] 36 51.1
† F . . . critical event set; mr/c. . . number of mitigations+resumptions/constraints; |R(F )|. . . cardinality of the risk space; tY . . . YAP’s processing time;
P¬A. . . probability of conditional accident freedom; Ξ. . . set of F -unsafe states; sta/tra. . . number of states/transitions of the MDP (sta equals the size
of the policies); Formulas (a) to (c). . . optimisation queries; tP . . . PRISM’s processing time
C. Discussion
Relative Safety of a Policy: To simplify game-theoretic
reasoning about M, we reduce non-deterministic choice for
the environment (i.e., operator, robot, welder). The more
deterministic such choice, the closer the gap between policy
space ΠM and ASC design space. Any decisions left to the
environment will make a verified policy pi safe relative to pi’s
environmental decisions. These decisions form the assumption
of the ASC’s safety guarantee. Occupational health and safety
assumes trained operators not to act maliciously, suggesting
“friendly environments” with realistic human errors. To in-
crease priority of the ASC, we can express such an assumption,
e.g. by minimising risk and maximising pot.
Sensing Assumptions: In our example, the ASC relies on
the detection of an operator (e.g. extremities, body) and a
robot (e.g. arm, effector) entering a location, the cell state (e.g.
grabber occupied, workbench support filled), and the work-
piece location (e.g. in grabber, in support). ForM, we assume
the tracking system (i.e., range finder and light barrier in
the industrial setting, Kinect in the lab replica) to map the
location of the operator and robot to the areas “at table”, “at
workbench”, “in cell”, and “at welding spot”. In Fig. 1b, the
range finder signals “at welding spot” if the closest detected
object is nearer than the close range, and “in cell” if the closest
object is nearer than the wide range. Tracking extensions, not
discussed here, could include object silhouettes and minimum
distances, operator intent, or joint velocities and forces.
Sensor Faults: pGCL requires much care with the mod-
elling of real-time behaviour, particularly, when actions from
several concurrent modules are enabled. To model real-time
ASC behaviour, we synchronise operator actions with sensor
events and force the priority of ASC reactions in pi? by
maximising the risk reduction potential (cf. pot in Tab. III).
While synchronisation restricts global variable use increasing
M’s state space, we found it to be the best solution.
Model Debugging and Tool Restrictions: To reduce the state
space, we strongly discretise location. To simplify debugging,
we use probabilistic choice in synchronous updates only in
one of the participating commands. To support synchronisation
with complex updates, we avoid global variables.
State rewards would allow a natural modelling of, e.g. risk
exposure. In PRISM 4.5, one needs to use action rewards
for multi-objective queries of MDPs. Risk gradient matrices
help to overcome a minor restriction in PRISM’s definition of
action rewards.4 Alternatively, we could have introduced extra
states, however, at the cost of increasing M’s state space,
undesirable for synthesis. Rewards require the elimination of
non-zero end components (i.e., deadlocks or components with
cycles that allow infinite paths and, hence, infinite reward
accumulation). PRISM provides facilities to identify such
components, however, their elimination is non-trivial and labo-
rious in large models and can require intricate model revisions.
VII. CONCLUSION
We introduced a tool-supported method for the correct-by-
construction synthesis of automatic safety controllers from
Markov decision process models of human-robot collaboration
settings. These controllers implement regulatory safety goals
for such settings. We describe steps for streamlining the mod-
elling of MDPs. Our method draws support from two tools,
YAP for structured risk modelling and MDP generation and
PRISM for probabilistic model checking and MDP policy syn-
thesis. We show that our approach can be used to incrementally
build up multi-hazard models including alternative mitigation
and resumption options. Hence, our approach improves the
state of the art of ASC synthesis for HRC settings, particularly
when dealing with multiple risks, mitigation options, and
safety modes. The verification results obtained by using our
method can form evidence in an ASC assurance case [29].
Future Work: Our approach limits the inference of high ef-
fectiveness of an ASC from high conditional accident freedom
of the associated policy. Our setting can require the assessment
of how much the decisions of the ASC and the environment
contribute to the accident freedom. We plan to explore game-
theoretic settings to remove this limitation.
The evaluation of the verified controller in the manufactur-
ing cell (e.g. overhead in resource usage, influence on nominal
operation) is out of scope of this paper. Such an evaluation
requires the translation of the controller into an executable
form. Our next steps will be the conversion of the synthesised
4Currently, rewards cannot be associated with particular updates, i.e., with
incoming transitions rather than only states.
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DTMC into a program for the digital twin simulator and the
replica of the cell. Note that this translation has to be verified
to match the executable form with the verified properties.
Additionally, we plan to derive tests for this program from
the facilities provided by the simulator.
For optimal synthesis, the proposed method uses parameters
such as upper risk and severity bounds in constraints. We
plan to introduce parameters for the probabilities into the
MDP, supported by tools such as EVOCHECKER [30], and to
use parametric risk gradient matrices by extending YAP. We
intend to explore the use of EVOCHECKER to avoid the split
of the verification procedure into two stages (cf. Secs. V-D2
and V-D4). We also like to explore online policy synthesis to
allow more variety in environmental decisions (e.g. malicious
operators). This corresponds to weakening the assumptions
under which the ASC can guarantee safety.
Unable to collect data (cf. Sec. V-B) from an industrial
application, we had to make best guesses of probabilities.
However, the frequency of undesired intrusion of operators
into the safeguarded area and accident likelihood can be
transferred into our example. This example can be extended
by randomised control decisions with fixed probabilities (e.g.
workload), by adding uncertain action outcomes (e.g. welding
errors), and by time-dependent randomised choice of mitiga-
tion options. To use time in guarded commands, we want to
explore clock-based models as far as synthesis capabilities
allow this, rather than only using reward structures.
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